Quantum key distribution (QKD) promises unconditionally secure communications. However, as practical devices tend to deviate from their specifications, the security of some practical QKD systems is no longer valid. In particular, an adversary can exploit imperfect detectors to learn a large part of the secret key, even though the security proof claims otherwise. Recently, a practical approach-measurement-device-independent QKD (mdiQKD)-has been proposed to solve this problem. However, so far the security has only been fully proven under the assumption that the legitimate users of the system have unlimited resources. Here we fill this gap and provide a rigorous security proof of mdiQKD against general attacks in the finite-key regime. This is obtained by applying large deviation theory, specifically the Chernoff bound, to perform parameter estimation. For the first time we demonstrate the feasibility of long-distance implementations of mdiQKD within a reasonable time-frame of signal transmission.
form of Chernoff bound [34] , to perform the parameter estimation step. The latter is crucial to demonstrate that a long-distance implementation of mdiQKD (e.g., 200 km of optical fiber with 0.2 dB/km) is feasible within a reasonable time-frame. To obtain high secret key rates in this scenario, it is common to use decoy state techniques [35] [36] [37] , both for standard QKD protocols and mdiQKD. Here a key challenge is to estimate the transmittance and the quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the single-photon component of the signal at the presence of high losses (e.g., 40 dB). We show that such an estimation problem can be solved using Chernoff bound, as it provides good bounds for the parameters above even in the high-loss regime. We highlight that our results can be applied to other QKD protocols (e.g., the standard decoy state BB84 protocol [35] [36] [37] ) as well as to general experiments in quantum information.
II. SECURITY DEFINITION
Prior to stating the protocol, let us quickly review the security framework [32, 33] that we are considering here. A general QKD protocol (executed by Alice and Bob) generates either a pair of bit strings S A and S B , or a symbol ⊥ to indicate the abort of the protocol. In general, the string of Alice, S A , can be quantum mechanically correlated with a quantum state that is held by the adversary. Mathematically, this situation is described by the classical-quantum state
where {|s } s denotes an orthonormal basis for Alice's system, and the subscript E indicates the system of the adversary.
Ideally, we say that a QKD protocol is secure if it satisfies two conditions, namely the correctness and the secrecy. The correctness condition is met if S A = S B , i.e., Alice's and Bob's bit strings are identical. The secrecy condition is met if ρ AE = U A ⊗ ρ E , where U A = s 1 |S| |s s| is the uniform mixture of all possible values of the bit string S A . That is, the system of the adversary is completely decoupled from that of Alice.
Owing to the presence of errors, however, these two conditions can never be perfectly met. For example, in the finite-key regime it is impossible to guarantee S A = S B with certainty. In practice, this implies that we need to allow for some minuscule errors. That is, we say that a QKD scheme is ǫ cor -correct if Pr[S A = S B ] ≤ ǫ cor , i.e., the probability that Alice's and Bob's bit strings are not identical is not greater than ǫ cor . Similarly, we say that a protocol is ǫ sec -secret if 1 2
where · 1 denotes the trace norm. That is, the state ρ AE is ǫ sec -close to the ideal situation described by U A ⊗ ρ E . Thereby a QKD protocol is said to be ǫ-secure if it is both ǫ cor -correct and ǫ sec -secret, with ǫ cor + ǫ sec ≤ ǫ.
With this security definition we are able to guarantee that the security of the protocol holds even when combined with other protocols, i.e., the protocol is secure in the so-called universally composable framework [32, 33] .
III. PROTOCOL DEFINITION
The setup is illustrated in Fig. 1 . Alice and Bob each use a laser source to generate quantum signals that are diagonal in the Fock basis. Instances of such sources include attenuated laser diodes emitting phase-randomised WCPs, triggered spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources, and practical single photon sources. Each pulse is prepared in a different BB84 state [38] , which is selected, for example, uniformly at random from two mutually unbiased bases, denoted as Z and X. The signals are sent to an untrusted relay Charles, who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement that projects them into a Bell state. Also, Alice and Bob apply decoy state techniques [35] [36] [37] to estimate the gain (i.e., the probability that the relay outputs a successful result) and the QBER for various input photon numbers.
Next, Charles announces whether or not his measurements are successful, including the Bell states obtained. Alice and Bob keep the data that correspond to these instances and discard the rest. Also, they post-select the events where they employ the same basis. Finally, either Alice or Bob flips part of her/his bits to correctly correlate them with those of the other. See Table I for a detailed description of the different steps of the protocol.
Since Charles' measurement is basically used to post-select entanglement between Alice and Bob, the security of mdiQKD can be proven by using the idea of time reversal. Indeed, mdiQKD build on the earlier proposals of timereversed EPR protocols by Biham et al. [39] and Inamori [40] , and combine them with the decoy state technique. The end result is the best of both worlds-high performance and high security. We note on passing that the idea of time reversal has also been previously used in other quantum information protocols including one-way quantum computation. [38] with a polarisation modulator (Pol-M). Also, they use an intensity modulator (Decoy-IM) to generate decoy states. The signals are sent to an untrusted relay Charles, who is supposed to perform a Bell state measurement that projects the incoming signals into a Bell state. See the main text for details.
State Preparation
Alice and Bob repeat the first four steps of the protocol for i = 1, . . . , N till the conditions in the Sifting step are met. For each i, Alice chooses an intensity a ∈ {as, a d 1 , . . . , a dn }, a basis α ∈ {Z, X}, and a random bit r ∈ {0, 1} with probability pa,α/2. Here as (a d j ) is the intensity of the signal (decoy) states. Next, she generates a quantum signal (e.g., a phase-randomised WCP) of intensity a prepared in the basis state of α given by r. Likewise, Bob does the same.
Distribution
Alice and Bob send their states to Charles via the quantum channel. Table II ). Afterwards, they execute the last steps of the protocol for each k. to estimate n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 . The parameter n k,0 (n k,1 ) is a lower bound for the number of bits in Z k where Alice (Alice and Bob) sent a vacuum (single photon) state. e k,1 is an upper bound for the single photon phase error rate. If e k,1 > e tol , an empty string is assigned to S k and steps 6 and 7 are aborted for this k, and the protocol only aborts if e k,1 > e tol ∀k.
Measurement

Error Correction
For those k that passed the parameters estimation step, Bob obtains an estimateẐ k of Z k using an information reconciliation scheme. For this, Alice sends him leak EC,k bits of error correction data. Next, Alice computes a hash of Z k of length ⌈log 2 (4/ǫcor)⌉ using a random universal2 hash function, which she sends to Bob together with the hash [32] . If hash(Ẑ k ) = hash(Z k ), Alice and Bob assign an empty string to S k and abort step 7 for this k. The protocol only aborts if hash(Ẑ k ) = hash(Z k ) ∀k.
Privacy Amplification
If k passed the error correction step, Alice and Bob apply a random universal2 hash function to Z k andẐ k to extract two shorter strings of length ℓ k [32] . Alice obtains S k and BobŜ k . The concatenation of S k (Ŝ k ) form the secret key SA (SB). 
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
We now present one main result of our paper. It states that the protocol introduced above is both ǫ cor -correct and ǫ sec -secret, given that the length ℓ of the secret key S A is selected appropriately for a given set of observed values. See Table I for the definition of the different parameters that we consider in this section.
The correctness of the protocol is guaranteed by its error correction step, where, for each possible Bell state k, Alice sends a hash of Z k to Bob, who compares it with the hash ofẐ k . If both hash values are equal, the protocol gives S k =Ŝ k except with error probability ǫ cor /4. If hash(Ẑ k ) = hash(Z k ), it outputs the empty string (i.e., the protocol is trivially correct). Moreover, if the protocol aborts, the result is ⊥, i.e., it is also correct. This guarantees that S A = S B except with error probability less or equal than ǫ cor . Alternatively to this method, note that Alice and Bob may also guarantee the correctness of the protocol by exploiting properties of the error correcting code employed [42] . The protocol is ǫ sec -secret, with ǫ sec ≤ k ǫ k,sec , if the length ℓ k of each bit string S k , which forms the secret key S A , satisfies
, and where
is the binary Shannon entropy. Here, the parameters ε k,0 , ε k,1 , and ε k,e quantity, respectively, the probability that the estimation of the terms n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 is incorrect. A sketch of the proof of Eq. (1) can be found in Appendix A. There it is also explained the meaning of all the epsilons contained in the term ǫ k,sec , which we omit here for simplicity. In the asymptotic limit of very large data blocks, the terms reducing the length of S A due to statistical fluctuations may be neglected, and thus ℓ satisfies ℓ ≤ k max {n k,0 + n k,1 [1 − h (e k,1 )] − leak EC,k , 0}, as previously obtained in [23] . That is, n k,0 and n k,1 provide a positive contribution to the secret key rate, while n k,1 h (e k,1 ) and leak EC,k reduce it. The term n k,1 h (e k,1 ) corresponds to the information removed from Z k in the privacy amplification step of the protocol, while leak EC,k is the information revealed by Alice in the error correction step.
The second main contribution of this work is an estimation method to obtain the relevant parameters n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 needed to evaluate the key rate formula above, when Alice and Bob send Charles a finite number N of signals and use a finite number of decoy states. We solve this problem using techniques in large deviation theory. More specifically, we employ Chernoff bound [34] . It is important to note that standard techniques such as Azuma's inequality [41] do not give very good bounds here. This is because this result does not consider the properties of the a priori distribution. Therefore, it is far from optimal for situations such as high loss or a highly bias coin flip, which are relevant in long-distance QKD. In contrast, Chernoff bound takes advantage of the property of the distribution and provides good bounds even in a high-loss regime.
More precisely, we show that the estimation of n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 can be formulated as a linear program, which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time and gives the exact optimum even for large dimensions [43] . Importantly, this general method is valid for any finite number of decoy states used by Alice and Bob, and for any photonnumber distribution of their signals. Also, for the typical scenario where Alice and Bob send phase-randomised WCPs together with two decoy states each, we solve analytically the linear program, and obtain analytical expressions for the parameters above, which can be used directly in an experiment. A sketch of the estimation method is given in Appendix B. For a detailed analysis of both estimation techniques we refer to the Appendices C and D.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section we analyse the behaviour of the secret key rate provided in Eq. (1). In our simulation, we consider that Alice and Bob encode their bits in the polarisation degrees of freedom of phase-randomised WCPs. Also, we assume that Charles uses the linear optics quantum relay illustrated in Fig. 2 , which is able to identify two of the four Bell states. With this setup, a successful Bell state measurement corresponds to the observation of precisely two detectors (associated to orthogonal polarisations) being triggered. Note, however, that the results presented in this paper can be applied to other types of encoding schemes like, for instance, phase or time-bin encoding [1, 2] , and to any quantum operation that Charles may perform, as they solely depend on the measurement results that he announces.
We use experimental parameters from [44] . But, whereas [44] considers a free-space channel, we employ a fiber-based channel with a loss of 0.2 dB/km. The detection efficiency of the relay (i.e., the transmittance of its optical components together with the efficiency of its detectors) is 14.5%, and the background count rate is 6.02 × 10 −6 . Moreover, we use a rather generic channel model that includes an intrinsic error rate which simulates the misalignment and instability of the optical system. This is done by placing a unitary rotation in both input arms of the 50 : 50 beam splitter, and another unitary rotation in one of its output arms [45] . In addition, we fix the security bound to ǫ = 10 The overall misalignment in the channel is 1.5%, and the security bound ǫ = 10 −10 . For simulation purposes we consider the following experimental parameters [44] : the loss coefficient of the channel is 0.2 dB/km, the detection efficiency of the relay is 14.5%, and the background count rate is 6.02 × 10 −6 . Our results show clearly that even with a realistic finite size of data, say N = 10 12 to 10 14 , it is possible to achieve secure mdiQKD at long distances. In comparison, the dotted line represents a lower bound on the secret key rate for the asymptotic case where Alice and Bob send Charles infinite signals and use an infinite number of decoy settings.
The results are shown in Figs. 3-4 for the situation where Alice and Bob use two decoy states each. In this scenario, we obtain the parameters n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 using the analytical estimation procedure introduced above (see Appendix C for more details). The first figure illustrates the secret key rate (per pulse) ℓ/N as a function of the distance between Alice and Bob for different values of the total number of signals N sent. We fix ǫ cor = 10 −15 ; this corresponds to a realistic hash tag size in practice [32] . Also, we fix the intensity of the weakest decoy states to a d2 = b d2 = 5 × 10 −4 , since, in practice, is difficult to generate a vacuum state due to imperfect extinction. This value for a d2 and b d2 can be easily achieved with a standard intensity modulator. Moreover, we assume an error correction leakage of leak EC,k = n s ζh(E as,bs k ), with ζ = 1.16 and where h(·) is again the binary Shannon entropy. For a given distance, we optimise numerically ℓ/N over all the free parameters of the protocol. This includes the intensities a s , a d1 , b s and b d1 , the probability distributions p a,α and p b,β in the state preparation step, the parameters N a,b k and M a,b k in the sifting step, the term n k in the parameter estimation step, and the different epsilons contained in ǫ sec . Our simulation result shows clearly that mdiQKD is feasible with current technology and does not require high detection efficiency detectors for its implementation. If Alice and Bob use laser diodes operating at 1 GHz repetition rate, and each of them sends N = 10 13 signals, we find, for instance, that they can distribute a 1 Mb secret key over a 75 km fiber link in less than 3 hours. This scenario corresponds to the red line shown in Fig. 3 . Notice that, at telecom wavelengths, standard InGaAs detectors have modest detection efficiency of about 15%. Since mdiQKD requires two-fold coincidence rather than single-detection events, as is the case in the standard decoy state protocol, the key rate of mdiQKD is lower than that of the standard decoy state scheme. However, with high-efficiency detectors such as silicon detectors [46] in 800nm or high-efficiency SSPDs [47] , the key rate of mdiQKD can be made comparable to that of the standard decoy state protocol.
The second figure illustrates ℓ/N as a function of N for different values of the misalignment in the limit of zero distance. For comparison, this figure also includes the asymptotic secret key rate when Alice and Bob send an infinite number of signals and use and infinite number of decoy states [23] . Our results show that significant secret key rates are already possible with 10 11 signals, given that the error rate is not too large.
VI. CONCLUSION
We have proved the security of mdiQKD in the finite-key regime against general attacks. This is the only known fully practical QKD protocol that offers an avenue to bridge the gap between theory and practice in QKD implementations. Importantly, our results clearly demonstrate that even with practical signals [e.g., phase-randomised weak coherent pulses (WCPs)] and a finite size of data (say 10 12 to 10 14 signals) it is possible to perform secure mdiQKD over long distances (up to about 150 km).
To achieve high secret key rates in such high-loss regime, it is typical both for standard QKD schemes and mdiQKD to use decoy state techniques. A main challenge in this scenario is to obtain tight bounds for the gain and quantum bit error rate (QBER) of the single-photon components sent by Alice and Bob. We have shown that this estimation problem can be successfully solved using techniques in large deviation theory, more precisely, Chernoff bound. This result takes advantage of the property of the distribution, and thus provides good bounds for the relevant parameters even in the presence of high losses, as is the case in QKD realisations.
Using Chernoff bound we have rewritten the problem of estimating the gain and QBER of the single-photon signals as a linear program, which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time. This general method is valid for any finite number of decoy states, and for any photon-number distribution of the signals. It can be used, for instance, with laser diodes emitting phase-randomised WCPs, triggered spontaneous parametric down-conversion sources, and practical single photon sources. Also, for the common scenario where Alice and Bob send phase-randomised WCPs together with two decoy states each, we have obtained tight analytical bounds for the quantities above. These results apply to different types of encoding schemes like, for example, polarisation, phase or time-bin encoding.
VII. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
We thank Xiongfeng Ma and Johan Löfberg for valuable comments and stimulating discussions, and Lina M. Eriksson for comments on the writing and presentation of the paper. F. Xu. thanks the Paul Biringer Graduate Scholarship for financial support. We acknowledge support from the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF), the Galician Regional Government (projects CN2012/279 and CN 2012/260, "Consolidation of Research Units: AtlantTIC"), NSERC, the CRC program, the National Centre of Competence in Research QSIT, the Swiss NanoTera project QCRYPT, and the FP7 Marie-Curie IAAP QCERT project. K.T. acknowledges support from the project "Secure photonic network technology" as part of "The project UQCC" by the National Institute of Information and Communications Technology (NICT) of Japan, and from the Japan Society for the Promotion of Science (JSPS) through its Funding Program for World-Leading Innovative R&D on Science and Technology (FIRST Program).
Appendix A: Secrecy
Here, we briefly discuss on the secrecy of the protocol described in Table I . To begin with, note that Alice and Bob obtain the error rate E as,bs k using a random sample of Z as,bs k of size R k . This means that when E as,bs k satisfies the tolerated value E tol , the error rate between the strings Z k and Z ′ k , which we denote as ξ as,bs k , satisfies the following inequality written as conditional probability [48] Pr ξ as,bs k
where ∆(x, y, z) = (y + x)(y + 1)/(xy 2 ) ln z −1 . Here, the parameter Ω pass represents the event that all the tests performed during the realisation of the protocol satisfy the tolerated values. Let E ′ denote the adversary's information about Z k up to the error correction step in Table I . By using a privacy amplification scheme based on two-universal hashing [32] we can generate an ǫ k -secret string S k of length ℓ k , where ε k > 0, and
The function H 4ε k min (Z k |E ′ ) denotes the smooth min-entropy [32, 49] . It quantifies the average probability that the adversary guesses Z k correctly using the optimal strategy with access to E ′ . The term E ′ can be decomposed as E ′ = CE, where C is the information revealed by Alice and Bob during the error correction step, and E is the adversary's information prior to that step. Using a chain-rule for smooth entropies [32] , we obtain
with |C| ≤ leak EC,k + log 2 (8/ǫ cor ). The bits of Z k can be distributed among three different strings: Z 
where
Here, we have used the fact that Hε
The latter arises because vacuum states contain no information about their bit values, which are uniformly distributed.
The next step is to obtain a lower bound for the term H
Taking that Alice and Bob do the state preparation scheme perfectly in the Z and X bases, we can re-write this quantity in terms of the smooth max-entropy between them, which is directly bounded by the strength of their correlations [51] . More precisely, the entropic uncertainty relation gives us
Combining Eqs. (A2,A3,A4,A5), we find that a secret key of length ℓ k given by Eq. (1) gives an error of
Finally, after composing the errors related with the estimation of n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 , selectingε ′ k andε ′′ k equal to zero, and also removing the conditioning on Ω pass , we obtain a security parameter ǫ k,sec given by
where ε k,b =ε k Pr[Ω pass ], and ε k,0 , ε k,1 and ε k,e denote respectively the error probability in the estimation of n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 .
Appendix B: Sketch of the parameter estimation method
To simplify the discussion, let us consider the estimation of the parameter n k,0 . The method to obtain n k,1 and e k,1 follows similar arguments. The procedure can be divided into two steps. First, we calculate a lower bound for the number of indexes in Z as,bs k where Alice sent a vacuum state. This quantity is denoted as m k,0 . Second, we compute n k,0 from m k,0 using Serfling inequality for random sampling without replacement [48] .
In the first step we use a multiplicative form of Chernoff bound [34] for independent random variables, which does not require the prior knowledge on the population mean. More precisely, Claim 1. Let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , be a set of independent Bernoulli trials that satisfy Pr(X i = 1) = p i . And, let
is the mean value. Then, we have that
except with error probability γ = ε +ε, where the parameter δ ∈ [−∆,∆], with ∆ = g(X, ε 4 ) and∆ = g(X,ε 2 ), and the function g(x, y) = x ln (y −2 ), given that (ε
2 and (ε −1 ) 1/X ≤ exp (1/4). Importantly, the fluctuation parameter δ which appears in Eq. (B1) is independent of the mean value µ. A proof of Claim 1 can be found in Appendix E.
In order to apply this statement and be able to obtain the parameter m k,0 , we rephrase the protocol described in section III as follows. For each signal, we consider that Alice (Bob) first chooses a photon number n (m) and sends the signal to Charles, who declares whether his measurement is successful or not. After, Alice decides the intensity setting a, and Bob does the same. This virtual protocol is equivalent to the original one because the essence of decoy state QKD is precisely that Alice and Bob could have postponed the choice of which states are signals or decoys after Charles' declaration of the successful events. This is possible because Alice's and Bob's observables commute with those of Charles. Note that for each specific combination of values n and m, the observables that Alice and Bob use to determine whether a state is a signal or a decoy act on entirely different physical systems from those of Charles. This implies that Alice and Bob are free to postpone their measurement and thus their choice of signals and decoys. Also, this result shows that for each combination n and m, the signal and decoy states provide a random sample of the population of all signals containing n and m photons respectively. Therefore, one can apply random sampling theory in classical statistics to the quantum problem.
Let S k,nm denote the set that identifies those signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they select the Z basis and Charles announces the Bell state k. And, let |S k,nm | = S k,nm , and p a,b|nm,Z be the conditional probability that Alice and Bob have selected the intensity settings a and b, given that their signals contain, respectively, n and m photons prepared in the Z basis. Then, if we apply the above equivalence, independently of each other and for each signal Alice and Bob assign to each element in S k,nm the intensity setting a, b, with probability p a,b|nm,Z .
Let X a,b i|k,nm be 1 if the ith element of S k,nm is assigned to the intensity setting combination a, b, and otherwise 0. And, let
except with error probability γ a,b = ε a,b +ε a,b , where
Using similar arguments, we find that the parameter m k,0 can be written as
except with error probability ε 0 , where ∆ 0 = g( m p as,bs|0m,Z S k,0m , ε 0 ). Now, it is easy to find a lower bound for m k,0 . One only needs to minimise Eq. (B4) given the linear constraints imposed by Eq. (B3) for all a, b. This problem can be solved either using numerical tools as linear programming [43] or, for some particular cases, also analytical techniques. See the Appendices C and D for details.
The second step of the procedure is quite direct. Note that Alice forms her bit string Z k using n k random indexes from Z as,bs k . Using [48] we obtain
except with error probability
where ε ′ k,0 corresponds to the total error probability in the estimation of m k,0 , and the function Λ(x, y, z) is defined as Λ(x, y, z) = (x − y + 1) ln (z −1 )/(2xy).
Appendix C: Analytical estimation of n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1
This Appendix contains a general method to obtain an analytical expression for n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 , when Alice and Bob use two decoy states each and the photon number distribution of their signals is Poissonian.
That is, here we assume that a ∈ A = {a s , a d1 , a d2 }, with a s > a d1 > a d2 , b ∈ B = {b s , b d1 , b d2 }, with b s > b d1 > b d2 , and the probability that Alice (Bob) sends an n-photon (m-photon) signal when she (he) selects the intensity a (b) is given by p n|a = e −a a n /n! (p m|b = e −b b m /m!). A similar estimation procedure has been recently introduced in [52] . Note, however, that [52] considers one of the two decoy signals a vacuum state. Unfortunately, this assumption is very hard to guarantee in practical QKD implementations, due to the finite extinction ratio of the intensity modulator [53] . Also, [52] analyses the asymptotic regime where Alice and Bob send an arbitrarily large number of signals. Below we introduce a general analytical method that overcomes both difficulties.
We begin by introducing some notations. Let S k,nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they select the basis Z and Charles declares the Bell state k. As noted in Appendix B, for each combination of values n and m, the signal and decoy states provide a random sample of the population of all signals containing n and m photons respectively. Therefore, standard large deviation theory techniques such as the Chernoff bound apply [34] . We obtain
except with error probability γ a,b = ε a,b +ε a,b , where ε a,b refers to the failure probability of one side, whereasε a,b refers to that of the other side. The total failure probability is thus the sum and is denoted by γ a,b . The parameter
, and the function g(x, y) = x ln (y −2 ). A proof of Eq. (C1) can be found in Appendix B (see also Appendix E).
Estimation of n k,0
The procedure to obtain n k,0 can be decomposed into two steps. First, we calculate a lower bound for the number of indexes in Z as,bs k where Alice sent a vacuum state. This quantity is denoted as m k,0 , and can be written as
except with error probability ε 0 , where ∆ 0 = g( m p as,bs|0m,Z S k,0m , ε 0 ). The proof of Eq. (C2) follows similar lines as the proof of Eq. (C1) [34] . Second, we use Serfling inequality for random sampling without replacement [48] to compute n k,0 from m k,0 . Let us begin with the first step. According to Eq. (C2), to compute m k,0 we need to search for a lower bound for m p as,bs|0m,Z S k,0m .
The probability p a,b|nm,Z can be written as
where p a,b,Z denotes the probability that Alice and Bob send signals in the Z basis with intensity a and b respectively. Using the fact that p n|a = e −a a n /n! and
with the term τ nm given by
Hence, we have that Eq. (C3) can be expressed as
with the parameter T k,0m given by
whereS k,nm = S k,nm /τ nm . In so doing, we reduce the problem of finding m k,0 to that of calculating a lower bound for
. This is what we do next. Our starting point is Eq. (C1), which now can be rewritten as
with |Z
Next, we combine the quantities given by Eq. (C9) in such a way that we can cancel out the terms of the formS k,1m . For this, we define the parameter L k,a0,a1 as
a 0 a As a result we find, therefore, that
except with error probability a γ a,bs . Moving to the second step, we use Serfling inequality [48] to compute n k,0 from m k,0 . This is so because Alice forms her bit string Z k using n k random indexes from Z as,bs k
. We obtain
where the function Λ(x, y, z) is defined as Λ(x, y, z) = (x − y + 1) ln (z −1 )/(2xy), and ε ′ k,0 ≤ ε 0 + a γ a,bs .
Estimation of n k,1
To estimate n k,1 we employ the same two-step method that we used to obtain n k,0 . That is, we first compute a lower bound for the number of indexes in Z as,bs k where Alice and Bob sent a single photon. We shall denote this quantity as m k,1 , which can be written as
except with error probability ε 1 , where the parameter ∆ 1 = g(p as,bs|11,Z S k,11 , ε 1 ). Again, this statement can be proven with similar arguments to those used to prove Eq. (C1). Second, we calculate n k,1 from m k,1 using Serfling inequality [48] . According to Eq. (C14), to compute m k,1 we need to search for a lower bound for S k, 11 . This is what we do next. Our starting point is Eq. (C9). The estimation method is then divided into two steps. First, we cancel the terms S k,0m andS k,n0 using Gaussian elimination. Second, we cancel either the parameterS k,12 orS k,21 , depending on the combination of intensities that are used in the first step; this will become clear below.
Let us begin with the first step. For this, we introduce a vector of intensities v = [a 0 , a 1 , b 0 , b 1 ] that satisfies a 0 > a 1 and b 0 > b 1 , with a i ∈ A and b i ∈ B. Then, we find that the parameters G k,v defined below do not contain any term of the formS k,0m orS k,n0 , with
Next, we move to the second step. Here, we select another vector
] that fulfils the same conditions as v, and, moreover, satisfies the following constraints:
′ , j ′ = 0, 1. Then, we need to consider two cases.
where the coefficients c nm and δ k,v,v ′ are given by
and the parameters δ 
From the conditions above, it is easy to show that c 11 ≥ 0 and c nm ≤ 0 when n + m ≥ 3. For simplicity, however, we de not include such proofs here. Combining these results with Eq. (C17), we obtaiñ
Now, we need to compute an upper bound for δ k,v,v ′ . Using the fact thatδ a,b ∈ [−Γ a,b ,Γ a,b ] except with error probability γ a,b , we obtain that
We find, therefore, that
expect with error probability
where V denotes the set of pairs of vectors v, v ′ , which satisfy the conditions required in Case 1.
and we proceed as in Case 1. We obtain
expect with error probability given by Eq. (C23), where V ′ contains vectors v, v ′ , which satisfy the conditions required in Case 2. Now, the coefficient
As a result, we obtain that S k,11 is lower bounded by
except with error probability given by Eq. (C23). Finally, we use Serfling inequality [48] and find that
except with error probability [54] 
The procedure to estimate e k,1 can be decomposed into three steps. First, we calculate a lower bound for the number of signals where Alice and Bob send a single photon state prepared in the basis X, and where Charles declares the Bell state k. We will denote this quantity asn k,1 . Second, we obtain an upper bound for the total number of errors in these signals. We shall denote this parameter asē k,1 . And, third, we use Serfling result [48] to compute e k,1 from n k,1 ,n k,1 andē k,1 . Now, suppose that we already completed the first two steps and we obtainedn k,1 andē k,1 . Then, the number of signals where Alice and Bob send a single photon state, and Charles declares the Bell state k, is lower bounded by n k,1 +n k,1 , with n k,1 given by Eq. (C28). Now, since these single photon signals (when averaged over Alice's and Bob's key bit values) are basis independent, Serfling inequality tells us that
where the function Υ(x, y, y) is defined as Υ(x, y, z) = (x + 1) ln (z −1 )/(2y(x + y)). Next, we calculaten k,1 andē k,1 , together with their associated error probabilities ε ′ k,e and ε ′′ k,e . To obtainn k,1 we use the same strategy presented in Appendix C 2 to calculate a lower bound for S k,11 . We only need to replace the basis Z with the basis X in all the mathematical expressions that appear in that Appendix. Thereby we find thatn k,1 has a similar expression to that given by Eq. (C27), except with error probability ε ′ k,e ≤ a,b γ a,b . Below we obtainē k,1 . For this, we need, however, to introduce a new group of index sets, whose elements we will denote by E a,b k . These sets identify signals where Charles declared the Bell state k, Alice and Bob selected the intensity settings a and b and the basis X, and, after applying the bit flip operation in the sifting step of the protocol, their bits differ. That is, E a,b k point to errors in the basis X. Also, let E k,nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they select the basis X, Charles declares the Bell state k, and, after applying the bit flip operation in the sifting step, Alice's and Bob's bits differ. That is,ē k,1 represents an upper bound for E k,11 .
Our starting point is the size of the sets E a,b
This equation can be rewritten as
k |/p a,b,X ,Ẽ k,nm = E k,nm /τ nm with τ nm having the form of Eq. (C6) but with p a,b,X instead of p a,b,Z , andδ a,b = e a+b δ a,b /p a,b,X . Next, we follow a similar procedure to that used in Appendix C 2. Now, however, we try to cancel out only the termsẼ k,0m andẼ k,n0 . For this, we introduce a vector v = [a 0 , a 1 , b 0 , b 1 ] that satisfies a 0 > a 1 and b 0 > b 1 , with a i ∈ A and b i ∈ B, and we define the parameters F k,v as
where δ v k =δ a0,b0 +δ a1,b1 −δ a0,b1 −δ a1,b0 . The third term on the r.h.s of Eq. (C34) is always greater or equal than zero. This means, in particular, that F k,v is lower bounded by
Now, we need to compute a lower bound for δ
, except with error probability γ a,b = ε a,b +ε a,b . We obtain, therefore, that
Finally, if we combine Eqs. (C35)-(C36), we find that E k,11 is upper bounded by
except with error probability ε ′′ k,e ≤ a,b γ a,b .
Appendix D: Numerical estimation of n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1
In this Appendix we present a numerical method to calculate n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 that is valid for any number of decoy states used by Alice and Bob, and for any photon-number distribution of their signals. It may be used, for instance, with sources emitting phase-randomised weak coherent pulses, triggered spontaneous parametric downconversion sources, and also with practical single photon sources. More precisely, we show that the estimation of these parameters can be written as a linear program, which can be solved efficiently in polynomial time, and gives the optimum even for large dimensions [43] .
Let us introduce first some notations. In particular, let N nm denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they select the Z basis. And, let N = n,m N nm be the number of signals sent in the Z basis. Using Chernoff-Hoeffding inequality for i.i.d. random variables [34, 55] , we have that
except with error probability γ nm = ε nm +ε nm . The term p nm|Z is a parameter that characterises the sources. It represents the conditional probability that Alice and Bob send a signal with n and m photons respectively, given that they selected the basis Z. The parameter δ nm lies in the interval [−∆ nm ,∆ nm ], with
Here, the function k(x, y, z) = ln (z −2 )(1 + 1 + 4xy/ ln (z −2 ))/2x, and the second term on the r.h.s. of Eqs. (D2)-(D3) is due to the fact that N ≥ N nm for all n, m. Also, we have that n,m N (p nm|Z + δ nm ) is by definition equal to N , i.e., the terms δ nm satisfy n,m δ nm = 0.
Based on the foregoing, we find that m k,0 can be calculated using the following linear program
The k |, max kl / ∈Scut p a,b|kl,Z and p nm|Z . Finally, given the tolerated failure probabilities ε a,b ,ε a,b , ε nm ,ε nm , ε andε, the value of∆ a,b , ∆ a,b ,∆ nm , ∆ nm ,∆ and ∆ is also known.
If we denote the solution to the optimisation problem given by Eq. (D9) as n sol , then from Eq. (C2) we have that
except with error probability ε ′ k,0 given by
To obtain n k,1 we use again the same two-step technique introduced in Appendix C 2. That is, we first calculate m k,1 , and then we use Eq. (C28). To estimate m k,1 , we first obtain a lower bound for S k,11 , and then we apply Eq. (C14). In so doing, we reduce the problem of calculating n k,1 to that of finding a lower bound for S k, 11 . This is what we do below.
For this, we reuse the linear program given by Eq. (D9), only substituting its linear objective function with S k,11 . If we denote the solution to this program as n sol , then from Eq. (C14) we have that
except with error probability ε ′ k,1 given by
3. Estimation of e k,1
Again, to estimate e k,1 we follow the same steps introduced in Appendix C 3. That is, we calculate the parameters n k,1 andē k,1 , and then we apply Eq. (C30).
a. Estimation ofn k,1
To obtainn k,1 we once more reuse the linear program given by Eq. (D9), only making the following three changes. First, all the parameters now refer to the X basis rather than the Z basis. For example, S k,nm will denote the number of signals sent by Alice and Bob with n and m photons respectively, when they select the X basis and Charles announces the Bell state k. And, likewise for the other parameters. Second, we substitute the probabilities p a,b|nm,Z and p nm|Z with p a,b|nm,X and p nm|X respectively, and the sets Z a,b k with X a,b k . Third, we replace the linear objective function by S k,11 .
Then, if n sol denotes the solution to this program, we have that
except with error probability ε ′ k,e given by
By using the same line of reasoning as in the previous sections, it is easy to show thatē k,1 can be calculated with the following linear program max E k,11 
except with error probability ε 
let X 1 , X 2 , . . . , X n , be a set of independent Bernoulli trials that satisfy Pr(X i = 1) = p i . And, let X = n i=1 X i and µ = E[X] = n i p i . Then, Chernoff bound indicates that [34, [56] [57] [58] 
Note that in both cases the probability is exponentially suppressed. Next, we will remove the dependence that the failure probabilities that appear on the r.h.s of Eqs. (E2)-(E3)-(E4) have on the unknown mean value µ. Note that to obtain an analytical expression for the parameters n k,0 , n k,1 and e k,1 (see Supplementary Methods 1), and to formulate the search for them as a linear program (as done in the Supplementary Methods 2), we need to eliminate such dependence on µ. 
To prove this statement, let us consider first Eq. (E5). We need to evaluate two cases: X ≤ µ and X > µ. Let us begin with the first case. Here we have that
since X − µ ≤ 0 and ǫX ≥ 0. For the second case (i.e., when X > µ) we select a parameterǭ = ǫX/µ and then we consider two possibilities depending on the value ofǭ. According to Eq. (E3), whenǭ < 2e−1, i.e., 0 < ǫ < (2e−1)µ/X, the probability that X − µ > ǫX =ǭµ is less or equal than 
In the equality condition we use µǭ 2 = X 2 ǫ 2 /µ, while in the inequality condition we use µ < X. Similarly, when ǫ ≥ 2e − 1, i.e., ǫ ≥ (2e − 1)µ/X, from Eq. (E4) we have that the probability that X − µ > ǫX =ǭµ is less or equal than
In the equality condition we useǭµ = ǫX, while the inequality condition is satisfied when ǫ ≤ 4/ log 2 (e). That is, if we combine Eqs. (E7)-(E8)-(E9) we obtain Eq. (E5). The proof of Eq. (E6) is similar. Here, however, we consider three cases: X ≥ µ, µ/k ≤ X < µ and X < µ/k, for some parameter k > 1. When X ≥ µ we have that
This is so because when X ≥ µ the term µ − X ≤ 0, while ǫX ≥ 0. Let us now consider the second case, i.e., µ/k ≤ X < µ. Here we have that 
In the inequality condition we use the fact that X < µ. Let us now consider the case X < µ/k. In this scenario,
with ξ = (k − 1)/k. Therefore, according to Eq. (E2), we have that this probability is upper bounded by 
where in the inequality condition we use µ > kX. If we combine the results above and we select, for simplicity, a parameter k = 2, we obtain Pr[X − µ < −ǫX] ≤ max{e −Xǫ 2 /8 , e −X/4 }.
Finally, using the fact that e −Xǫ 2 /8 ≥ e −X/4 when 0 < ǫ ≤ √ 2, we obtain Eq. (E6). If we now use Eqs. (E5)-(E6) we find that the parameter X = µ + δ, except with error probability γ = ε +ε, where the term δ lies in an interval [−∆,∆] that satisfies the following conditions. If (ε −1 ) 1/X ≤ exp [2/ log 2 (e)] 2 then∆ = g(X,ε 2 ). This result comes from the requirement 4/ log 2 (e) ≥ ǫ = g(1/X,ε 2 ), which is satisfied for the situations analysed in this paper. Similarly, we find that ∆ = g(X, ε 4 ) when (ε −1 ) 1/X ≤ exp (1/4), since here we need √ 2 ≥ ǫ = g(1/X, ε 4 ). This requirement is also fulfilled in the situations considered in this paper. Otherwise, we have ∆ = √ 2X with ε = e −X/4 .
